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In this Article, we seek to help guide law enforcement activities 
targeting gun acquisition by high-risk people by examining two potentially 
important sources of crime guns: licensed retail dealers and traffickers.  
Limited data availability is a key reason more is not currently known about 
how criminals obtain guns.  This Article assembles a unique dataset that 
combines five years (2009–2013) of crime gun trace requests submitted to 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) National 
Tracing Center (NTC) by the Chicago Police Department (CPD), linked to 
other CPD data sources about the person who was caught with the gun.  
From these data, we are able to identify which of the violators are or have 
been gang members and to compare their guns with those of violators who 
are not gang members.  We focus in particular on how gang members 
obtain guns, since this population is at the highest risk for shooting 
someone and for being shot.  We hypothesize that gang members may differ 
from others in how they access guns.  This hypothesis could help explain 
why our earlier work found that the underground gun market as a whole in 
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Chicago is characterized by high transaction costs that keep many 
criminals from becoming armed, yet the vast majority of the city’s 
homicides are committed with guns.  Our first finding is that the guns 
confiscated by the police from gang members tend to be quite old—a 
median age of over ten years—with every indication that they have gone 
through a series of transactions before being acquired by the current 
owner.  It is very rare for these guns to be purchased new from a gun dealer 
in a documented sale (occurring in less than 2% of circumstances).  Besides 
the age of the guns, the most striking fact about gang guns is that most 
come from out of state.  Even for new guns, fully 60% are imported.  It 
appears that while licensed dealers may play some small direct role in 
arming gang members, other intermediaries are far more important.  If 
enforcement is to be effective at reducing access to guns by gang members, 
a likely focus is on the intermediaries in the underground market—straw 
purchasers, brokers, and traffickers.  Gathering information on these 
intermediaries will require interviews with the violators in addition to 
further analysis of trace data. 
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INTRODUCTION1 
In 2011, nearly half a million people were the victims of gun crime in 
the United States, according to data from the National Crime Victimization 
Survey (NCVS).2  The annual social cost of gun violence in America may 
be on the order of $100 billion per year;3 these harms are concentrated 
disproportionately in America’s largest urban areas that are home to some 
of society’s most economically and socially vulnerable members.4  For 
example, in the City of Chicago, the study site for this Article, the homicide 
rate has averaged from sixteen to eighteen per one hundred thousand people 
in recent years—about three times the national average.5  This citywide rate 
masks large and persistent geographic differences.  Some communities 
experience zero homicides in a typical year; meanwhile, some of the most 
 
 1 This Article was prepared for a special symposium entitled Guns in America organized 
by the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology at Northwestern University School of Law.  
The work reported on here was supported by operating grants to the University of Chicago 
from the MacArthur and McCormick foundations, as well as project grants from the Joyce 
and McCormick foundations and the Fund for a Safer Future.  Our thanks to Roseanna 
Ander, Mark Jones, Susan Parker, Dan Rosenbaum, and Matthew Smith for valuable 
assistance and comments, and to the Chicago Police Department for making the crime-gun 
trace data analyzed in this paper available to our team.  We also thank the Journal staff, 
particularly Carolyn Hill, Sarah Halbach, Cristina Law, Abigail Leinsdorf, Bobby Murphy, 
and Vanessa Szalapski for their assistance in preparing this article for publication.  Any 
errors and all opinions are of course our own.  
 2 Gun Violence, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, http://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/gun-violence/
Pages/welcome.aspx (last modified Apr. 4, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/8L3U-R2TU. 
 3 PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOLENCE: THE REAL COSTS 11 (2000). 
 4 See ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008, at 29 (2011), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QA5Y-
QM2A; see also CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, 
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 14 (2013), http:// 
www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p60-245.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3Q5Y-ENS5. 
 5 The homicide rates for the United States and Chicago specifically equaled 4.7 and 18.5 
in 2012, 4.7 and 15.9 in 2011, and 4.8 and 16.0 in 2010 (all rates per 100,000 people).  See 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING 
STATISTICS, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/Crime.cfm (last visited May 29, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7Z2X-T96T (for the national homicide rate, follow “All 
States and U.S. Total,” then follow “One year of data,” then under “a. Choose one or more 
states” select “United States – Total,” and under “b. Choose one or more variable groups” 
select “Number of violent crimes,” and under “c. Choose one year” select either “2012,” 
“2011,” or “2010” and follow “Get Table”; for the Chicago homicide rate, follow “Larger 
Agencies,” then follow “One year of data,” then select “Cities 1,000,000 or over” and follow 
“Next,” then under “a. Choose one or more agencies” select “IL – Chicago Police Dept,” and 
under “b. Choose one or more variable groups” select “Number of violent crimes,” and 
under “c. Choose one year” select “2012,” “2011,” or “2010” and follow “Get Table”). 
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violent neighborhoods experience homicide rates of thirty to ninety per one 
hundred thousand people.6 
Gun involvement greatly enhances the social costs of violent crime by 
enhancing the lethality of interpersonal violence: gun assaults are over 
thirteen times more lethal than criminal attacks involving knives,7 and much 
more lethal still compared to attacks in which no weapon is used at all.8  
One indication of the relative lethality of guns compared to other weapons 
commonly used in violent crime is their overrepresentation in homicides 
(68% nationwide), compared to robberies (41%) or aggravated assaults 
(21%).9  There is considerable evidence that the heightened “case fatality 
rate” for gun attacks is partly due to the ease of killing with a gun 
(compared to a knife or club), rather than to difference in the assailant’s 
intent.10 
 
 6 The homicide rates in 2011 and 2012 were 30.5 and 36.5 per 100,000 people in the 
Austin neighborhood on Chicago’s west side, 91.3 and 59.2 in the south-side Englewood 
neighborhood, and 53.9 and 77.0 in Woodlawn, the neighborhood directly south of the 
University of Chicago’s Hyde Park campus.  Crimes  2001 to Present, CITY OF CHI. DATA 
PORTAL, https://data.cityofchicago.org/Public-Safety/Crimes-2001-to-present/ijzp-q8t2 (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/C37B-4MQT (data calculated using Stata 
analysis package); City of Chicago Census 2010 and 2000, CITY OF CHICAGO, http://
www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/zlup/Zoning_Main_Page/Publications/
Census_2010_Community_Area_Profiles/Census_2010_and_2000_CA_Populations.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8A8L-MBPV. 
 7 This statistic is based on an original computation utilizing online data from the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control and addresses homicide and assault data from 2011.  See NAT’L 
CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
FATAL INJURY REPORTS, NATIONAL AND REGIONAL, 19992011, http://webappa.cdc.gov/
sasweb/ncipc/mortrate10_us.html (accessed July 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/N93J-
Y228.  We find that there were 11,522 deaths classified as “homicide and legal intervention” 
caused by firearm, and that there were 1,797 deaths in this category caused by “cut/pierce.”  
Id.  We find that there were 55,544 injuries classified as “assault – all” caused by firearm, 
and 135,525 nonfatal injuries in this category caused by “cut-pierce.”  See NAT’L CTR. FOR 
INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
NONFATAL INJURY REPORTS, 20012011, http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/
mortrate10_us.html (accessed July 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/KK9C-CNVW.  All 
of these injuries were treated in an emergency department.  Id.  The case fatality rate for 
firearm assaults is then computed as 11,522/(11,522 + 55,544)=17.18%.  The case fatality 
rate for “cut/pierce” assaults is computed as 1,797/(1,797 + 135,525)=1.31%.  The ratio of 
these two results is 17.18/1.31=13.1. 
 8 JEFFREY A. ROTH, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FIREARMS AND 
VIOLENCE 1 (Feb. 1994), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/145533NCJRS.pdf, 
available at http://perma.cc/8Z25-7NB3. 
 9 COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 2. 
 10 On the lethality of firearms, see Philip J. Cook, The Technology of Personal Violence, 
14 CRIME & JUST. 1, 1314 (1991); Frank Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent 
Killing?, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 721, 724–25 (1968); Franklin E. Zimring, The Medium Is the 
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The greater availability of guns in America provides one possible 
explanation for a striking pattern.  Overall U.S. rates of violent crime are 
similar to those of other developed nations.11  Yet U.S. homicide rates are 
many times the median rate among thirty-six industrialized nations.12  This 
difference suggests that reducing gun involvement in criminal violence 
would greatly reduce the social costs of the problem, even if the overall 
volume of interpersonal violence were unchanged.  In short, guns do not 
necessarily cause violence, but their use in violence increases the likelihood 
of death. 
For the most part, the policy debate in the United States around gun 
violence has focused on the regulation of firearm transactions, possession, 
and use—“gun control.”  The chance of more stringent legislation in this 
area at the federal level or in Illinois seems low for the foreseeable future.  
In fact, recent judicial decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Seventh 
Circuit have gone in the other direction.  The Supreme Court required 
Chicago to allow residents to keep handguns in their homes,13 while the 
Seventh Circuit mandated that Illinois permit concealed carrying of 
firearms.14  Which local firearm regulations will ultimately be deemed 
constitutionally permissible is somewhat hard to predict at present. 
So what can be done?  One answer is enforcement of existing 
regulations.  Federal enforcement of firearms regulations and prohibitions is 
the responsibility of the U.S. Department of Justice through the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).15  Most enforcement of 
laws regarding the criminal use of guns is the responsibility of local and 
 
Message: Firearm Caliber as a Determinant of Death from Assault, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 97, 97 
(1972); see also Philip J. Cook, The Case of the Missing Victims: Gunshot Woundings in the 
National Crime Survey, 1 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 91 (1985); Philip J. Cook & Jens 
Ludwig, Aiming for Evidence-Based Gun Policy, 25 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 691 
(2006). 
 11 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL 
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 3 (1997). 
 12 OECD Better Life Index: Safety, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., http://www.
oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/safety/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/4XY2-M35F; see David Hemenway & Matthew Miller, Firearm Availability and 
Homicide Rates Across 26 High-Income Countries, 49 J. TRAUMA, INJ., INFECTION, & 
CRITICAL CARE  985, 986 (2000). 
 13 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).  
 14 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 934, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).  
 15 BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
ATF NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT HANDBOOK 3 (2009), https://www.atf.gov/files/publications/
download/p/atf-p-5320-8/atf-p-5320-8.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5RBM-ECQC. 
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state police departments.16  As in all areas of policing, departments have 
discretion in setting strategic and tactical priorities in this area and appear to 
differ greatly in what they do and how they do it.17  Regardless, a key 
limiting factor in shaping enforcement activities is money.  General fund 
revenues for U.S. cities declined for six straight years from 2007 to 2012.18  
Even in better fiscal times, the resources available for supporting 
enforcement activities are finite.19  Scarce funding means that it is important 
for local policymakers to focus enforcement activities on those tactics and 
strategies that generate the largest social good per dollar spent, which in 
turn requires guidance from the best available data and empirical evidence. 
In this Article, we seek to help guide enforcement activities intended 
to reduce gang members’ access to guns by investigating two potentially 
important sources—licensed retail dealers and traffickers.  Our primary data 
set for this investigation utilizes firearms trace data, which merges 
information on the original sources of guns confiscated by the Chicago 
Police Department (CPD) with criminal history data on those who were 
arrested in conjunction with the confiscation.  More specifically, this data 
set consists of crime gun trace requests submitted to ATF’s National 
Tracing Center (NTC) by the CPD over the course of a five-year period 
(2009–2013), which our team then linked to other CPD administrative data 
sources about the person who was caught with the gun—including their 
prior criminal history and any gang affiliation. 
These data on each person caught with a crime gun, including that 
person’s identified gang affiliation, are particularly important to help 
answer a puzzle raised by some of our previous work.  In our 2007 article 
Underground Gun Markets, we found evidence that guns are surprisingly 
difficult to obtain in the underground gun market in Chicago.20  This 
evidence includes substantial price markups for guns on the street relative 
 
 16 See generally John E. Eck & Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced 
Violent Crime?  An Assessment of the Evidence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 207–65 
(Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000).  This chapter describes the wide range of 
policing strategies that different departments across the United States adopted over the 
course of the 1990s. 
 17 Id. 
 18 MICHAEL A. PAGANO & CHRISTIANA MCFARLAND, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, 
RESEARCH BRIEF ON AMERICA’S CITIES: CITY FISCAL CONDITIONS IN 2013, at 2 (2013), http://
www.nlc.org/Documents/Find%20City%20Solutions/Research%20Innovation/Finance/
Final_CFC2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HSB8-VCMV. 
 19 See OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE IMPACT 
OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON AMERICAN POLICE AGENCIES 2 (2011), available at http://
www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/e101113406_Economic%20Impact.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3NLJ-R7D5. 
 20 Philip J. Cook et al., Underground Gun Markets, 117 ECON. J. F588, F590 (2007). 
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to the purchase price in legal transactions, substantial legal or physical risk 
and delays for criminals in their attempts to get a gun, and the existence of a 
system of retail brokers who charge a fee to facilitate exchanges between 
gun buyers and sellers.21  Yet despite the difficulty for most people in 
getting guns on the streets, roughly four in five homicides in Chicago are 
committed with guns.22  One way to reconcile this apparent contradiction is 
the hypothesis that those people at highest risk for involvement in 
shootingsin Chicago, mostly gang membershave more ready access to 
guns than does the average delinquent or criminal. 
“Dirty dealers”—that is, dealers who intentionally violate the law—
appear to account for a small share of all crime guns that wind up in the 
hands of gang members.  Guns carried by gang members tend to be quite 
old—over ten years old on average—and to have changed hands many 
times.  Direct, well-documented sales of guns by dealers to gang members 
account for less than 2% of the total.  Of course, dealers may be supplying 
gang members through other types of transactions that are not observable 
using trace data: straw purchases, undocumented sales, transactions 
involving used guns, or theft.  We do not find much evidence for large-scale 
illegal diversion of inventory by gun dealers.  Our data do provide 
suggestive evidence, however, that when gang members are carrying new 
guns, those guns are relatively likely to come from a “straw purchase,” in 
which someone (often assumed to be a girlfriend or wife) buys a gun on 
behalf of someone else who is legally prohibited from owning a gun.  We 
also find that gun trafficking may be a more important source of guns to 
gang members than to other gun violators.   
We find that only a small percentage of crime guns were directly 
obtained new from a Federal Firearms License (FFL) dealer in a 
documented sale.23  This pattern holds true for crime guns confiscated from 
gang members as well as non-gang members.  One challenge with 
 
 21 Id. at F594–96. 
 22 CHI. POLICE DEP’T, CHICAGO MURDER ANALYSIS 25 (2011), https://
portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/News/Statistical%20Reports/Murder
%20Reports/MA11.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8XM3-NCUM.  From 1991 to 2011, the 
percent of homicides commited by shooting ranged from 69.0% to 83.4%.  The previous ten 
years of available data (2002–2011) show that 78.98% of Chicago's homicides are 
committed with firearms.  Id. 
 23 Sales of used guns by FFLs cannot be identified from trace data.  The rules governing 
transactions by FFLs are not affected by whether the gun is new or used.  Yet the normal 
trace process only reaches the first sale.  This process follows the supply chain using the 
serial number of the gun to the point of a first-sale 4473.  There is no way to determine 
whether the gun was sold again by an FFL, let alone by which FFL. 
724 COOK, HARRIS, LUDWIG, & POLLACK [Vol. 104 
estimating this percentage from administrative data sources is matching 
individually-identifying information in the ATF crime-gun trace data to 
CPD arrest records and other data sources, given the presence of data entry 
errors and missing data.  We use probabilistic match techniques and 
estimate that 11% of adults acquired their crime guns new from an FFL 
dealer in a documented sale.  This estimate is quite close to a comparable 
estimate (11.4%) based on the most recent national survey of adult 
prisoners, which was conducted in 2004.24 
We also find that relatively few crime guns wind up in the hands of 
gangs because of illegal diversions of inventory by FFL dealers, at least as 
best as we can tell in our data.  We use our dataset to calculate the share of 
crime guns that could be traced back to an identified FFL dealer but for 
which the paperwork kept by the FFL dealer was not available.  We use this 
as a proxy for off-the-books transactions, such as selling inventory illegally 
out the back door; such transactions account for 5% of guns associated with 
gang members, almost identical to the share of guns taken from violators 
who are not in gangs. 
Straw purchases seem to be a more important source of crime guns to 
gangs compared to other types of dealer sales.  As one indication of the 
volume of straw purchases, we estimate that 15% of new guns that were 
sold within two years of confiscation and were taken from male gang 
members were first sold to a woman.  Our data provide no direct way to tell 
how often dealers knew or suspected that a given sale was a straw purchase. 
For enforcement purposes, a major concern is the possibility that gang 
members get their guns directly from “dirty dealers,” that is, FFL dealers 
who are willing to violate the law by selling guns to people who should not 
be legally allowed to have them—including by looking the other way 
during a straw purchase.  One indication for whether this is happening 
would be that guns found in the hands of gang members should come from 
a smaller set of FFL dealers compared to what we see for crime guns found 
among non-gang members.  We do see one locale where there is somewhat 
greater dealer concentration for gang than non-gang guns: among guns first 
sold in Cook County,25 the three most common dealers account for 76% of 
guns recovered from gang members and 65% of guns recovered from 
others.  But for guns first sold in other Illinois counties or out of the state, 
the pattern is reversed. 
 
 24 See Daniel W. Webster et al., Preventing the Diversion of Guns to Criminals Through 
Effective Firearm Sales Laws, in REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 109, 110 (Daniel W. 
Webster & Jon S. Vernick, eds., 2013) (discussing the most recent Survey of Inmates in 
State Correctional Facilities from 2004). 
 25 Cook County is Illinois’s most populous county and contains the City of Chicago. 
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Most gang guns come from central or southern Illinois, or another state 
(especially Indiana), even more so than what we see among crime guns 
found among non-gang members.  Interestingly, Indiana sources are more 
prominent for new guns than older guns, suggesting that they are more 
likely to be trafficked directly.26  We also find that compared to crime guns 
taken from people not in a gang, a higher share of crime guns from gang 
members have obliterated serial numbers (5.4% vs. 3.4%), one indicator of 
trafficking. 
One clear conclusion is that most guns taken from gang members in 
Chicago pass through the hands of at least one intermediary—a third party 
that helped the gun move from dealer to gang member.  This result suggests 
the potential value of investigations focused on those in the underground 
gun market who help put guns into the hands of violent street gangs. 
Another conclusion from our findings is that enforcement efforts to 
reduce gang member access to guns are not futile.  Crime guns tend to be 
remarkably old in Chicago, with an average age of 12.6 years (median of 
10.4), and in fact are older for gang members than non-gang members (a 
median of 11.6 versus 6.9 years).  Since criminals are widely reported to 
prefer newer guns, this is one indication that barriers exist to getting guns in 
the underground gun market even for gang members, consistent with the 
findings in Underground Gun Markets.27  We also find some indication that 
gun violators are likely to have been in possession of a particular gun for a 
relatively brief period of time, which also supports the basic premise of 
enforcement efforts that try to reduce gun access to high-risk people. 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part I provides a 
review of existing federal, state, and local law that governs firearms 
transactions in Chicago, as well as what is currently known about the 
underground gun market in Chicago and more generally.  Part II describes 
the data we analyze in this Article.  Part III reports our results for the role 
that FFL dealer sales play among the crime guns confiscated from gang 
members and non-gang members, while Part IV reports what our data can 
tell us about gun trafficking, which we define as importing guns into 
Chicago for illicit distribution in the informal or underground market.  The 
Conclusion discusses the limitations of the data sources and analyses 
 
 26 In principle, some of what appears to be trafficking in these data could instead be the 
result of people buying guns in some other state, then moving to Chicago and having their 
gun stolen.  But, as we demonstrate below, theft from new immigrants cannot plausibly 
account for any but a trivial portion of the total flow of guns from Indiana. 
 27 Cook et al., supra note 20. 
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presented here and potential implications for law enforcement and crime 
policy more generally. 
I. GUN TRANSACTIONS, LICIT AND ILLICIT 
Gun commerce is primarily regulated by the federal Gun Control Act 
of 1968,28 which stipulates that those in the business of manufacturing, 
importing, or selling guns must have a federal license.29  Only those with 
federal licenses may receive direct shipments of guns.30  It is safe to say that 
almost all guns in private hands were sold new by a licensed dealer.  
Federal regulations require that before an FFL may transfer a gun to a 
customer, the customer must show identification and fill out a 4473 form 
that states that he or she is not disqualified from owning a gun due to a 
felony conviction or one of nine other conditions.31  State regulations may 
also apply, and FFL dealers are obligated to follow them.32  The dealer 
conducts a background check through the state or federal system to confirm 
lack of disqualification, and then transfers the gun.33  The dealer is required 
to keep the 4473 form on file and to show it to federal investigators when 
asked.34  When a dealer goes out of business, these forms are to be shipped 
for storage in an ATF warehouse.35 
Guns are consumer durables.  The original buyer may transfer the gun 
to someone else by sale, loan, gift, or rental arrangement—or lose it, 
perhaps to theft.  In some cases, resales are through a licensed gun dealer, 
who must again follow federal rules governing transactions.  But private 
transactions are not much regulated by federal law, with one main 
exceptiona gun cannot be shipped directly to an out-of-state purchaser 
unless that person has a retail license.36  Federal law bans knowingly 
transferring to someone who is disqualified.37 
 
 28 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 92128 (2012)). 
 29 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. § 922(d). 
 32 Id. § 922(b)(2); ATF Commerce in Firearms & Ammunition Rule, 27 C.F.R. 
§ 478.99(b)(2) (2014). 
 33 § 478.102(a). 
 34 § 478.121; § 478.124; § 478.129. 
 35 § 478.127; see § 478.57; 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(4) (2012). 
 36 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(3) (2012). 
 37 Id. § 922(d); 27 C.F.R. § 478.32. 
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Seventeen states, including Illinois, impose some additional regulation 
on private transfers.38  In Illinois, anyone who acquires a gun from any 
source must have a Firearm Owners Identification card (FOID), and as of 
2013, anyone who transfers a gun privately must keep a record of that 
transfer for ten years after the sale.39  The City of Chicago imposes 
additional restrictions: together with Washington, D.C.,40 it has been the 
most tightly regulated city in the nation, effectively banning residents from 
keeping handguns in city limits from 1982 to 2010, and now requiring that 
handguns be registered.  At the time of this Article, there are still no retail 
dealers in the city limits (though new regulations that allow gun dealers to 
operate in a very small portion of the city recently passed the City Council), 
requiring prospective gun purchasers to travel to the suburbs to buy a new 
gun.41 
In practice, legitimate gun owners acquire their guns from a variety of 
sources by a variety of means.  Unfortunately, there is little documentation 
of the pattern of gun transactions.  One notable exception is the National 
Survey of Private Ownership of Firearms in the United States (NSPOF), 
which was conducted in 1994 and was one of the first nationally 
representative surveys to ask about the stock and flow of guns in the United 
States.42  The NSPOF asked respondents to describe how they obtained 
their most recent gun, including whether they bought the gun (and, if so, 
from what source) or obtained it as a loan or gift.43  Focusing on guns 
acquired during the two years preceding the survey (19931994), about 
 
 38 Universal Background Checks & the Private Sale Loophole Policy Summary, LAW 
CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (Aug. 21, 2013), http://smartgunlaws.org/universal-gun-
background-checks-policy-summary/, archived at http://perma.cc/4ZZJ-YNCY. 
 39 ILL. STATE POLICE FIREARMS SERVS. BUREAU, ACQUIRING OR TRANSFERRING FIREARMS 
IN ILLINOIS 12, http://www.isp.state.il.us/docs/9-049.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/S824-H7WX; see also Firearm Owners Identification Card Act, 
430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 65/2(a) (West 2014); id. § 65/3(a). 
 40 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574–75 (2008). 
 41 Julie Bosman, Mayor of Chicago Seeks to Further Tighten Gun Laws, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 29, 2014, at A20; John Byrne & Bill Ruthhart, Emanuel Touts Monthly Phone Fee Hike 
for Pensions, CHI. TRIB., Jun. 25, 2014, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-06-25/news/
chi-emanuel-gun-sale-plan-to-get-city-council-vote-today-20140624_1_property-tax-hike-
911-fee-increase-phone-tax, archived at http://perma.cc/MG8-5RCX. 
 42 PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUNS 
IN AMERICA: NATIONAL SURVEY ON PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND USE OF FIREARMS (1997), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/165476.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WD9V-
SNPV. 
 43 Id. at 6. 
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60% were obtained from what appears to be a licensed dealer.44  Put 
differently, about 40% changed hands in a transaction that did not involve a 
licensed gun dealer, what Cook, Molliconi, and Cole termed the “secondary 
market.”45  That NSPOF survey is the origin of the 40% statistic that 
became famous during the 2013 national debate over universal background 
checks.46 
Table 1 
Sources of Firearms to Gun Owners, Guns Acquired  
Within the Past Two Years 







(1) Cash purchase from gun, 
hardware or department store, from 
pawnshop, or from seller at gun 
show, flea market or military, or 
through mail that respondent says 
“yes” was FFL 
57.0 62.7 52.4 
    
(2) Add cash purchase from seller at 
gun show, flea market or military, or 
through mail, that respondent says 
“probably was/think so”  
58.4 64.2 53.6 
    
(3) Add non-cash transactions 
(trades) with sources in (1) and (2) 
60.1 66.4 54.8 
    
 
 44 Id.  
 45 Philip J. Cook et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 
6263, 68 (1995). 
 46 After the mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, 
the Obama administration supported a proposal to require universal background checks for 
all handgun sales, not just those involving licensed gun dealers, and cited the NSPOF 
estimate that 30%–40% of all gun transactions each year in the United States occur in the 
secondary market.  Many opponents of universal background checks challenged the 40% 
statistic, while the media had trouble understanding the estimate.  For example, the 
Washington Post’s fact checker, Glenn Kessler, unhelpfully got caught up in the fact that 
President Obama said “sales” rather than “transactions,” although the most likely 
explanation for that word choice is that some speechwriter made the not unreasonable 
decision that “transactions” is a clumsy term to use in a presidential speech.  See Glenn 
Kessler, Obama’s Continued Use of the Claim That 40 Percent of Gun Sales Lack 
Background Checks, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2013, 6:02 AM), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/obamas-continued-use-of-the-claim-that-40-
percent-of-gun-sales-lack-background-checks/2013/04/01/002e06ce-9b0f-11e2-a941-
a19bce7af755_blog.html, archived at http://perma.cc/DJ3Q-KLK4. 
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(4) Add cash purchases, trades with 
family, friends/acquaintance that 
respondent says are or probably are 
FFLs 
64.3 72.1 57.8 
    
(5) Add gifts, inheritances, prizes 
from sources in (1) through (4) 
73.6 84.2 64.7 
Source:  PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN AMERICA, 28 tbl. 3.14 (1996). 
 
Guns used in crimes are far less likely to be acquired from a licensed 
dealer than are other guns in private hands.  Much violent crime is 
committed by those under the age of twenty-one, who are barred from 
buying a handgun from a dealer.47  Many adult criminals are disqualified 
from buying or possessing a gun due to a felony conviction and would fail a 
background check if they attempted to purchase a gun under their true 
identity.48  An additional barrier in Illinois is the necessity of obtaining a 
Firearm Owner Identification (FOID) card before purchasing a gun.49 
One guide to how criminals obtain their guns is a 2004 survey of 
inmates of state prisons conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice.  
Restricting the sample to just those that have been in prison for two years or 
fewer (who can provide relatively current information), the survey data 
indicate that 12% of guns last possessed by the inmates had been purchased 
from a dealer.50  Most guns acquired by these inmates came from their 
family and social network, or from “street” sources.51 
 
 47 In 2012, 24.1% of all arrests nationwide for violent crime were of individuals under 
the age of twenty-one.  Violent crimes were defined by the FBI Uniform Crime Reports as 
murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, 
larceny-theft, and arson.  FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN 
THE UNITED STATES 2012, at tbl.38, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/
2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/38tabledatadecoverviewpdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/EXM3-V2PS.  In addition, according to the 2006 Statistical 
Tables for the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), for violent crimes, respondents 
self-reported that 28.2% of single-offender victimizations were committed by those under 
the age of twenty-one and 34.9% of multiple-offender victimizations were committed by 
individuals who were all under the age of twenty-one.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. NCJ 22436, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2006 
STATISTICAL TABLES 27 tbl.39, 34 tbl.45 (2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/c
vus0602.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/A8U2-LHQR. 
 48 Philip J. Cook et al., Criminal Records of Homicide Offenders, 294 JAMA 598, 598 
(2005). 
 49 ILL. STATE POLICE FIREARMS SERVS. BUREAU, supra note 39, at 1. 
 50 As calculated by authors in PHILIP J. COOK & KRISTIN A. GOSS, THE GUN DEBATE: 
WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 87–88 (2014); see BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SURVEY OF INMATES IN STATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND THE 
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Table 2 
Sources of Firearms Reported in Prisoner Survey, 2004 National Survey by 
Respondents Serving Less than Two Years 
 SISCF 2004 
Friends and Family 41% 
Illegal / street 32% 
Retail 12% 
Other 14% 
Source: Based on the 2004 Survey of Inmates of State Correctional Facilities52  
 
Unsurprisingly, juveniles must obtain their guns almost entirely from 
social connections and other informal sources, including theft, gifts and 
loans from adults, and discards, as they are prohibited from purchasing 
these weapons from a legal retail outlet.53  Suggestive findings from small-
scale surveys indicate that guns turn over quickly among juvenile 
offenders54 and that juveniles are likely to obtain their first gun from a 
family member, but subsequent guns from acquaintances.55 
A multipronged study of the underground gun market in Chicago 
provides additional information about how youths and criminals obtain or 
fail to obtain guns in this tightly regulated environment.56  Two of the 
current authors, Cook and Ludwig, worked with the ethnographer Sudhir 
Venkatesh and the criminologist Anthony Braga.  Venkatesh interviewed a 
 
SURVEY OF INMATES IN FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES QUESTIONNAIRE (2004), 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sisfcf04_q.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
PG8E-7CSR; see also Webster et al., supra note 24, at 110. 
 51 In 1986, James Wright and Peter Rossi published their seminal volume, Armed and 
Considered Dangerous: A Survey of Felons and Their Firearms, on how and why criminals 
acquire firearms, using a nationally representative survey of nearly 1,900 male felons serving 
time in state prisons.  They found that about one in six gun criminals got their guns from an 
FFL and while 75% of their sample had owned a gun at some point in their life, “only” half 
of the sample reported using a gun while committing a crime at some point in their criminal 
careersuggesting that gun possession may be a temporary rather than permanent state.  
JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF 
FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 1, 13, 17 (1986). 
 52 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 50, as calculated in COOK & GOSS, supra 
note 50, at 87–88. 
 53 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012); Cook et al., supra note 45, at 70. 
 54 Cook et al., supra note 45, at 90. 
 55 Daniel W. Webster et al., How Delinquent Youths Acquire Guns: Initial Versus Most 
Recent Gun Acquisitions, 79 J. URB. HEALTH 60, 60, 66 (2002). 
 56 See Cook et al., supra note 20. 
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variety of youths and adults who were involved in the underground 
economy in two distressed neighborhoods in Southside Chicago.57 
Venkatesh found evidence that the market for guns had high 
transaction costs for many participants, illustrated by the fact that some 
would-be buyers turned to brokers who for a $30–$50 fee would attempt to 
locate a sellerand not always succeed.58  The impression of high search 
costs was reinforced by surveys of arrestees conducted in Chicago under the 
Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) program by the U.S. 
Department of Justice; the “gun” supplement in the late 1990s found a high 
percentage of respondents saying that they would like to obtain a gun but it 
would take them a long time or be too expensive.59  We interpreted this and 
other evidence of high transaction costs as a reflection of the nature of this 
underground market, which has two key features: first, almost everyone 
was aware of the fact that the CPD placed a high priority on taking guns off 
the street and stopping gun sales.60  Second, the market for guns is 
intrinsically “thin”; in comparison with drugs, for example, there are 
relatively few potential buyers and not much profit to be made.61  Finding a 
gun “connection” was hence more difficult than finding a connection for 
drugs and other contraband.62 
Given this evidence, it is not surprising that only about 40% of 
robberies known to the police in Chicago are committed with guns, despite 
the fact that gun robberies tend to be more successful and lucrative than 
robberies with other weapons.63  More surprising is that almost all murders 
in Chicago are committed by gun.  The percentage in recent years has been 
in the 80%85% range, far above the national average of about 68%.64 
 
 57 Id. at F589. 
 58 Id. at F595. 
 59 Id. at F614. 
 60 Id. at F606. 
 61 Id. at F611. 
 62 See id. at F596. 
 63 Philip J. Cook, Robbery, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 
102, 109 (Michael Tonry ed. 2009).  This number is close to the national average. 
 64 The national average of 68% was calculated for all U.S. homicides in 2010.  See CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 7 (First, query “Violence-related, 
homicide” injuries in Box 1; query “firearm” in Box 2; limit analysis to Census Region, 
United States, 2010 report, All Races, All Hispanic Origins, Both Sexes (Box 3).  Second, 
query “Violence-related, homicide” injuries in Box 1; query “non-firearm” in Box 2; limit 
analysis to Census Region, United States, 2010 report, All Races, All Hispanic Origins, Both 
Sexes (Box 3)).  With 11,078 firearm-caused homicides and 5,181 non-firearm-caused 
homicides, the average percentage of homicides caused by firearms is 68.13%.  Id. 
The average Chicago gun share of homicides was calculated based on the following data: 
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While the underground gun market has high transactions costs that 
reduce gun ownership among common criminals and delinquents, the most 
dangerous peoplethose who account for the bulk of the killingdo 
appear to have access to guns.  The key to explaining this differential access 
may be the fact that the preponderance of murders in Chicago are 
committed by members of organized gangs, and that those gangs provide 
members with trustworthy connections from which to obtain a gun.65 
II. FIREARMS TRACE DATA 
The CPD has placed a priority on taking guns off the street since the 
1950s.66  In 2013, it “recovered” 6,813 guns, or about 2.5 per 1,000 
 
2011 – 83.4% 
2010 – 80.5% 
2009 – 81.7% 
2008 – 80.6% 
2007 – 73.3% 
2006 – 81.5% 
2005 – 75.7% 
CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 22, at 22; 
RESEARCH & DEV. DIV., CHI. POLICE DEP’T, 2010 MURDER ANALYSIS REPORT 22 (2012), 
https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/poral/ClearPath/News/Statistical%20Reports/
Murder%20Reports/MA10.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E2Q3-DT74;  
RESEARCH & DEV. DIV., CHI. POLICE DEP’T, 2009 MURDER ANALYSIS REPORT 22 (2012), 
https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/News/Statistical%20Reports/
Murder%20Reports/MA09_1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/98VY-WPGS;  
RESEARCH & DEV. DIV., CHI. POLICE DEP’T, 2008 MURDER ANALYSIS REPORT 21 (2009), 
https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/News/Statistical%20Reports/
Murder%20Reports/2008%20Murder%20Reports/MA08.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
8LDD-3G3X;   
RESEARCH & DEV. DIV., CHI. POLICE DEP’T, 2006–2007 MURDER ANALYSIS 23 (2008), 
https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/News/Statistical%20Reports/
Murder%20Reports/2006%20-%202007%20Murder%20Reports/06-07_MA.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/M95Q-F6LU;  
RESEARCH & DEV. DIV., CHI. POLICE DEP’T, 2005 MURDER ANALYSIS 25 (2006), 
https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/News/Statistical%20Reports/
Murder%20Reports/2005%20Murder%20Reports/Murder2005.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/A4DG-384S.   
 65 The Chicago Police Department 2011 homicide report notes that among the 312 
homicides where the police have determined a motive, 46% are either altercations that police 
attribute to “street gangs,” or homicides due to “gangland narcotics.”  CHI. POLICE DEP’T, 
supra note 22, at 2728.  The actual share of homicides involving people who are in gangs is 
surely much higher, since some homicides that, for example, occur because of love triangles, 
money, “other,” gambling, theft, robbery, or retaliation could have involved gang members. 
 66 Cook et al., supra note 20, at F606. 
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residents.67  The large majority of these guns are confiscated by the police 
in the course of a search of an individual, vehicle, or residence, or picked up 
where they are discarded at a crime scene.68 
To better understand the sources of guns used in crime, the CPD’s 
policy is to submit information about all recovered guns for tracing by the 
National Tracing Center (NTC) of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF).  In practice, a trace request is conducted 
online by filling out a form that includes the manufacturer, gun type, 
caliber, and model, its serial number, and information about the possessor 
(if any).69 
If the NTC is successful, it returns information on the 4473 form70 that 
documents all gun sales, including the dealer’s name, the purchaser’s name 
and demographic information, and the date of sale.  A successful trace 
travels the length of the supply chain, beginning with the manufacturer or 
importer, on to the distributors, and finally to the retail dealer.  Each link in 
the chain must have accurate records and cooperate with the request from 
the NTC if the trace is to be successful.  This cumbersome process can fail 
for many reasons.  Among the most important are if the serial number of the 
gun has been intentionally obliterated at some point and cannot be 
recovered; the gun was first sold before the recordkeeping requirements 
went into effect from the 1968 Gun Control Act; or the retail dealer does 
not produce the 4473 form.71 
The CPD provided the authors access to trace data from the last decade 
on the condition that it would have a chance to review any of our findings 
prior to public dissemination, primarily to guard against the risk of 
 
 67 News Release, Chi. Police Dep’t, Chicago Police Recovered 6,813 Illegal Guns in 
2013 (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.chicagopolice.org/MailingList/PressAttachment/
Release2013GunRecoveries.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X6HM-5SFT; see State & 
County Quick Facts, Chicago (City), Illinois, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.
census.gov/qfd/states/17/1714000.html (last visited June 21, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/W3RM-4X36 (estimating the 2013 Chicago population as 2,718,782).  
 68 We can see this indicator in the trace data we analyzed as part of this study.  This has 
been further corroborated by conversations between police officials and the authors. 
 69 The platform for these requests is called E-Trace and is only accessible to law 
enforcement agencies.  Its portal is available at https://www.atfonline.gov/etrace/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/ZBJ-6E46. 
 70 A sample 4473 form can be viewed at the following URL: http://www.atf.gov/files/
forms/download/atf-f-4473-1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E8ZN-TBK6.  This form is 
filled out by the purchaser and seller when a firearm is first sold at a retail source. 
 71 Note that if the dealer has gone out of business, these forms are supposed to be 
deposited with the NTC, where they must be searched by hand. 
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inadvertent disclosure of confidential information.72  From this trove of 
data, we created a research dataset consisting of traces that met the 
following conditions: 
 Firearms were recovered between January 1, 2009 and 
September 17, 2013; and 
 Firearms were in the possession of an identified individual 
under age forty at the time. 
We refer to the sample of guns submitted by CPD to ATF for tracing 
that meet the two criteria above as “crime guns.”  Since the possessor was 
arrested for most of the guns that met our conditions, it was possible to link 
the possessor to his or her Chicago criminal record.  If there was no 
matching record for the gun confiscation in the CPD arrest file, we assume 
the person was not arrested.  If, however, there was a match that includes a 
central booking number in the system, then we call that the “arrest” 
associated with the confiscation of the crime gun.  Appendix Table 1 
reports the distribution of criminal charges for the arrests associated with 
those caught in possession of the crime guns in our analysis sample.  The 
large majority of the arrests associated with the confiscation of the gun are 
for a weapons offense such as unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) or 
possession of a firearm without also having a valid Illinois FOID card.  It is 
possible that some of the people caught with these guns were later charged 
with a more serious crime that they had committed with the gun, but the 
arrest that resulted directly in the confiscation of the gun itself was for a 
weapons offense. 
Appendix Table 2 shows that the observed characteristics of the people 
found in possession of crime guns in Chicago change very little as we apply 
our different filters in Table 3 to define our final analysis sample. 
Some readers might worry that “under forty” is an overly broad 
category, since crime is so disproportionately concentrated among people 
who are in their teens or twenties.  But Appendix Table 3 shows that fully 
16% of arrestees under forty are ages thirty to thirty-nine and that that older 
cohort is quite similar in terms of prior record and prevalence of gang 
affiliation to younger arrestees. 
This analysis focuses on sources of guns to gang members.  Whether 
the possessor had an association with a gang at or before the time of arrest 
was determined from indicators that were found in the criminal record.  
Each firearm is linked to an incident number, to which one or more arrests 
 
 72 CPD data were accessed via a confidential data sharing agreement between the CPD 
and the University of Chicago Crime Lab.  Microdata used in this analysis will not be made 
available to the public by the CPD or the Crime Lab. 
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are linked in the CPD records.  A gun was considered to be a “gang gun” if 
the possessor had ever been arrested as a gang member in Chicago, as 
indicated by the inclusion of a “gang arrest card” in the file.73  Whenever 
the arresting officer has reason to believe an arrestee is a gang member 
based on a defined set of criteria,74 the officer is directed to fill out this card.  
In CPD’s data system, a person’s internal identification number is linked to 
an indication that he or she is a member of a given gang. 
As with any criminal justice data, there is surely some measurement 
error in the CPD indicator for gang affiliation.  Some actual gang members 
are not identified in these data, while some individuals identified as gang-
involved may no longer be active.  CPD does not usually change someone’s 
gang membership status, although there is a field in the system that 
indicates whether the person is believed to be an active or inactive member.  
Because the classification of some crimes (such as illegal gun possession) 
will depend on whether the person charged is a gang member, CPD officers 
presumably have some incentive to make these gang classifications in a 
way that will stand up to later scrutiny in court.   
We treat any arrest as a gang member to be an indication of gang 
membership across the entire duration of our data. 
 
 73 This indicator may not include individuals who have never been arrested or who have 
been arrested, but outside of Chicago.  Because of these data limitations, our estimates are 
likely understating the true prevalence of “gang guns” in our sample. 
 74 The specific directive to arresting officers is as follows: 
B. Determining an Individuals [sic] Criminal Street Gang Membership 
Probable cause to establish an individuals [sic] membership in a criminal street gang 
must be substantiated by the Department members [sic] experience and knowledge of 
criminal street gangs and corroborated by specific, documented, and reliable 
information, including, but not limited to: 
1. the individuals [sic] admission of membership. 
2. the wearing of distinctive emblems, tattoos, or similar markings indicative of a 
specific criminal street gang. 
. . . 
3. the use of signals or symbols distinctive of a specific criminal street gang. 
4. the identification of the individual as a member or affiliate of a specific criminal 
organization by an individual who has provided reliable information to the 
Department in the past and whose information can be independently corroborated. 
5. the identification of individuals as a member of a specific criminal organization 
by another Department member who has specialized knowledge and expertise 
concerning the subject criminal organization. 
Chi. Police Dep’t, Gang & Narcotics Related Enforcement Special Order S10-02-03, 
available at http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12a5752b-27112-
a586-d845218c69a1f912.html?ownapi=1, archived at http://perma.cc/EF9L-4XFP.   
736 COOK, HARRIS, LUDWIG, & POLLACK [Vol. 104 
 
Table 3 
Firearms Submitted for Tracing by the CPD, 2009–2013 
Group  Guns People 
1.  Total trace requests 
 
32,721  




3.  Trace requests for guns in possession of 
individuals younger than forty 
 
12,641  
4.  Trace requests for guns in possession of 








6.  Number of successful trace requests 
(group 5) that were for new guns (< 2 
years) at time of recovery 
1,251  
Source: CPD Trace Requests, 1/1/09 – 9/13/13. 
Note: The counts in the last column indicate the number of people associated with 
the trace requests.  In some cases, the same person is associated with several guns. 
 
Some kinds of information can only be determined if the trace was 
successful, including the age of the gun, and the location of first retail 
purchase.  For guns recovered from individuals under the age of forty who 
were arrested, 66% of traces were successful (Table 4).  The share of trace 
attempts that are successful is slightly lower for guns taken from gang 
members compared to guns taken from those not in gangs (64% versus 
70%). 
Table 4 






Percent of traces that were 
successful 
 
63.9% 70.4% 65.5% 
Number of traces that were 
successful over the number  
of traces submitted 
5,374 / 
8,410 
1,968 / 2,796 7,342 / 
11,206 
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Sample: All guns confiscated from people under forty who were arrested (Groups 4 
& 5, Table 3). 
It should be noted that unsuccessful traces are not the only problem in 
using trace data to characterize the supply chain of guns that end up in the 
hands of gang members.  In effect, guns recovered by the police are just a 
sample from the much larger “population” of guns in the hands of gang 
members.  That sample may or may not be representative of the relevant 
individuals (gang members with ready access to a gun).  If not, conclusions 
reached on the basis of analyzing recovered guns, especially recovered guns 
that have been successfully traced, may be misleading.75 
III. RETAIL DEALERS AS A DIRECT SOURCE OF GUNS TO VIOLATORS 
Our first use of the trace data is to investigate the importance of retail 
dealers as a direct source of the guns confiscated by the police from 
possessors under the age of forty.  We focus on this group because that 
under-forty population accounts for the vast majority of all gun violence 
that occurs in the United States each year.76  We limit the analysis to cases 
in which the possessor was arrested, since that allows us to use criminal 
record information to identify the violators who had a gang connection, as 
explained in Part II.  We also limit the analysis to guns that were 
successfully traced, since those are the only guns for which we have 
information on the purchaser and dealer involved in the gun’s first sale. 
The gang members, who make up nearly three-quarters of the total 
(4,550 out of 6,263), tend to be younger and to have more serious criminal 
records than the comparison group who were not in a gang (see Table 5).  
Indeed, 22% of the comparison group had no prior criminal record in 
Chicago and may have been arrested because, for example, they were 
discovered to be carrying a gun within city limits following a traffic stop.  
We use the “non-gang” sample as a comparison group for the “gang” 
sample, with the former representing those who tend to be less criminally 




 75 Philip J. Cook & Anthony A. Braga, Comprehensive Firearms Tracing: Strategic and 
Investigative Uses of New Data on Firearms Markets, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 277, 278 (2001); 
Gary Kleck & Shun-Yung Kevin Wang, The Myth of Big-Time Gun Trafficking and the 
Overinterpretation of Gun Tracing Data, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1250 (2009). 
 76 In the City of Chicago over the period from 2010 to 2012, fully 94% of people 
arrested for gun homicide were age forty or younger (based on original Crime Lab 
tabulations of CPD data).  
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Table 5 
Characteristics of Sample, Gang Members Versus Non-Gang Comparison 
Group 
 Gang members Non-gang comparison group Total 
Current arrest includes  
felony charge 
 
74.3% 59.3% 70.4% 
Prior felony arrest 
 
64.4% 28.8% 55.1% 
No prior record 
 
17.1% 21.7% 18.3% 
Under age twenty-one  
at arrest 
36.1% 19.2% 31.7% 
Total # 
 
6,585 2,315 8,900 
Sample: All people under forty who were arrested in connection with confiscated 
gun that was submitted for tracing (Groups 4, Table 3) 
 A. AGE OF GUNS 
Gang members are young.  Table 5 shows that over one-third are under 
age twenty-one at the time of the arrest that led to the gun confiscation.  Yet 
gang members tend to carry guns that have been in circulation for many 
years.  In fact, the median elapsed time between first retail sale and 
confiscation from a gang member is 11.6 years if the gun is successfully 
traced (see Figure 1).  The true age may be greater still, since one reason 
traces are unsuccessful is that the gun is too old.  Only about 10% of guns 
in the hands of gang members are less than two years old.  The comparison 
group of those not in a gang is carrying newer guns on average, with a 
median age of 6.9 years; around 25% are less than two years old.  The 
overall median age of all confiscated guns is 10.4. 
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Figure 1 
All Successfully Traced Firearms Recovered Jan. 1, 2009–Sept. 17, 2013, 
Time to Crime Twelve Years and Under Shown 
The fact that these gang guns tend to be quite old presumably is not 
because gang members prefer old guns.  In fact, in interviews they often 
express a preference for guns that are “new in the box.”77  Rather, the 
prevalence of older guns likely reflects what is available and affordable to 
these individuals.  Even for gang members, the underground market does 
not work as well as the licit market. 
B. DIRECT PURCHASE OF NEW GUNS FROM GUN DEALERS 
A 2004 survey of state prisoners found that only around 11% obtained 
their gun directly from a licensed dealer (see Table 2).78  One problem with 
 
 77 One reported reason for this preference is a concern about whether a gun has been 
used in previous shootouts at which the police gathered ballistic evidence.  David M. 
Kennedy et al., Youth Violence in Boston: Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, and a 
Use-Reduction Strategy, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 169–70 (1996). 
 78 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 50.  An earlier survey of prisoners 
carried out in 1982 found that only around one in six obtained their guns directly from a 
licensed gun dealer.  WRIGHT & ROSSI, supra note 51, at 17.  See also Webster et al., supra 
note 24, at 110.  There are several differences with the 2004 survey in addition to the twenty-
two-year time difference in which the data were collected: the Wright–Rossi sample was 
collected in just eleven prisons and is not representative of the overall prison population, and 
the result on guns does not distinguish between newly admitted prisoners and old-timers.  It 
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any survey is the possibility of reporting errors.  This could be a particular 
problem in this case given the potential for ambiguity about whether the 
gun seller was a licensed FFL dealer or not.  The potential confusion on this 
point can be seen in the results from the 1994 NSPOF phone survey of gun 
owners nationwide (results reproduced in Table 1 above).79  About 1.5% of 
handgun owners were not sure if the person from whom they bought a gun 
was a FFL dealer.  Another 2% say they got their gun through a “non-cash” 
transaction with a source they thought was or probably was a FFL dealer 
(which is possible but seems a little odd).  Even more puzzling, an 
additional 6% said they bought the gun from a family member, friend or 
acquaintance who they said was or probably was a FFL dealer.  Another 
10% say they got the gun from a source they thought was a FFL dealer 
through a gift, inheritance, or prize. 
The result of the 2004 prisoner survey is similar to the Chicago trace 
data in finding only a small role for FFL dealers: in particular, the name and 
demographic characteristics of the possessor match those on the 4473 form 
that accompanied the first retail sale in just 7.8% of cases.  The advantage 
of examining this question using administrative data is that there is no 
ambiguity about whether the seller was an FFL dealer.  The drawback of 
this approach is the possibility of “false negatives”—matches that are not 
recognized as such due to differences in, for example, how the name is 
spelled or in the date of birth.  We try to overcome this limitation by 
counting as a “match” not only those cases where the name and date of birth 
of the first purchaser is exactly the same as that of the gun violator (i.e. an 
“exact match”), but also those cases where there is a difference but of a sort 
that suggests a high probability of a match (for example, that the first name 
is “Al” on the arrest record and “Alan” on the 4473 form).  The 
probabilistic match improves sensitivity by allowing cases that do not 
match exactly on all fields to still be considered.80  In practice, the exact 
matches account for 87.5% of the total. 
 
is also true that most states in 1982 were not required to conduct background checks to 
verify the buyer’s eligibility to legally buy a gun, so we might expect the importance of 
direct sales from FFLs to have declined over time with the implementation of the Brady Act 
nationwide background-check requirements in 1994.  See Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook, 
Homicide and Suicide Rates Associated with Implementation of the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act, 284 JAMA 585, 585 (2000). 
 79 See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 42. 
 80 We used Merge Tool Box and first unduplicated the list of all purchasers and all 
possessors, then did different passes through the data “blocking” on one identifying variable 
at a time (first race, then gender, then date of birth) and then matching probabilistically on 
first and last name.  The “blocking” involves doing an exact match on the one identifier used 
for the blocking (such as race), to reduce the number of observations that the probabilistic 
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Almost all of these matches are with possessors who were twenty-two 
or older at the time of arrest, as shown in Figure 2.  That age effect 
presumably reflects the ban on dealer sales of handguns to those under 
twenty-one and the lag between purchase and confiscation.81  For those age 
twenty-two and over, 11.4% obtained their guns new directly from the 
dealer in a well-documented sale (see Table 6).  Note that almost the same 
percentage of new prisoners reported obtaining a gun from a dealer in the 
2004 Survey of Inmates of State Correctional Facilities (Table 2, above). 
 
Figure 2 
Percent of Firearms Where Violator and Purchaser Were the Same, by Age 
Firearms Recovered Jan. 1, 2009–Sept. 17, 2013 
 
Direct-purchase guns tend to be very new, reflecting the high turnover 
rate for guns used in crime.  Figure 3 shows the rapid decline in the share of 
direct-purchase guns by the age of the gun, defined using six-month 
intervals.  The median age of a direct-purchase gun is just 1.3 years.  Since 
our ATF trace data only capture the date of the first FFL dealer sale of the 
 
matching software has to compare.  Because we do multiple passes through the data, 
blocking on different fields, the blocking would only contribute to non-matches in cases 
where the observation in one dataset had different values for each and every one of the 
variables we try blocking on, which is very rare in practice for true matches. 
 81 Dealers may sell rifles and shotguns to eighteen-year-olds, but almost all of the guns 
in the sample—91.8%—are handguns. 
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gun, we cannot directly measure the time between the transaction and the 
gun violation for crime guns where the first purchaser and the possessor 
were not the same person.  But at least the result we do have, for the young 
age of guns where the possessor and purchaser are the same person, 
supports the view that guns used in crime have typically been in the hands 
of the violator for only a brief time. 
 
Figure 3 
Percent of Firearms for Which Violator and Purchaser Were the 
Same, by Time to Crime 
Firearms Recovered Jan. 1, 2009–Sept. 17, 2013 
 
Interestingly, the non-gang comparison group is much more likely to 
be in possession of a direct-purchase gun than the gang members (28% 
versus 3%, as shown in the last row of Table 6).  Part of the explanation 
may be that the gang members—even those who meet the age requirement 
for buying from a dealer—are more likely than the comparison group to be 
disqualified due to their criminal record.  The top two rows of Table 6 
divide the two groups of adult violators by whether their prior criminal 
record includes a felony arrest, demonstrating that that condition accounts 
for part (but only part) of the difference in direct-purchase rates between the 
two groups.  Even among people with a prior felony arrest, gang members 
are less likely than are those not in a gang to have purchased their gun 
directly from a FFL (1% versus 10%). 
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Table 6 
Percent of Guns Purchased New from Licensed Gun Dealer, by Gang 
Status and Prior Record of Adult Possessors 
 Gang members Non-gang comparison group Total 


















Sample: The people who were arrested in connection with a gun that was 
confiscated and successfully traced (Group 5, Table 3).  The sample is limited to 
people aged twenty-two and over.  A “new” gun is one that was confiscated within 
two years of its first retail sale.   
 C. INDICATORS OF STRAW PURCHASE AND DIVERSION BY DEALERS 
The direct-purchase indicator used above is whether the name and 
recorded characteristics of the violator are the same as recorded on the 4473 
form of the first retail sale.  Dealers may be providing guns to gang 
members in other ways that are not included among the matches.  For 
example: 
 The gun may have been purchased used from a dealer, in 
which case the relevant 4473 would exist, but not be reached 
in the trace process; 
 The gun may have been directly purchased with a counterfeit 
FOID card; 
 The gun may have been purchased by an intermediary in a so-
called “straw” purchase, of which the dealer may or may not 
have been aware; 
 The gun may have been sold “under the counter” with no 
documentation; or 
 The gun may have been stolen from the dealer by a clerk or 
burglar. 
The trace data provide scant evidence on these channels, although we 
can make some inferences with the help of a few assumptions.  For 
example, one pattern that is suggestive of a straw purchase is that a new gun 
was recovered from a man but had first been purchased by a woman.  For 
guns less than two years old, that pattern is much more common among 
gang members than in the comparison group, as shown in Table 7.  Fully 
15% of new guns in the hands of male gang members were first purchased 
by a female.  Of course, other scenarios may account for some portion of 
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the female-to-male transfers of new guns: some of those women may have 
been working on their own, buying guns “on spec” and selling as the 
opportunity arose, and others may have simply bought a gun for their own 
use but ended up sharing it or having it stolen by a man.  Still, we deem 
these results to be suggestive of the relatively greater importance of straw 
purchases for gang members than for others. 
 
Table 7 









15.1% 5.8% 11.1% 
Female buyer/  
female possessor 
 
0.7% 3.0% 1.7% 
Male buyer 
 




24.9% 26.1% 25.4% 
Total # < 2 years TTC 714 537 1,251 
Sample: The people who were arrested in connection with a gun that was 
confiscated and successfully traced (Group 5, Table 3).  The sample is limited to 
people aged twenty-two and over. 
 
Another channel by which gun dealers may supply gang members with 
guns is through off-the-books sales or theft from the store’s inventory.  
Transfers of this sort are by definition unrecorded, but there may be some 
indication in the trace data from the unsuccessful traces.  Some traces are 
successful in identifying the gun dealer that is named in the distributor’s 
record, but go no further.  The failure of the dealer to provide a 4473 form 
to ATF can result from the form being lost, but it may also reflect the fact 
that the transfer was off the books—an under-the-counter sale or a theft. 
To explore this possibility, we use an expanded sample of guns 
submitted for tracing.  We limited the sample to those guns that were 
recovered in connection with an arrest of someone under forty, and then had 
been traced to a retail dealer whether or not the information from the 4473 
was obtained.  Note that without the 4473, it is not possible to determine 
exactly when the gun was first sold by the gun dealer or who first purchased 
the gun. 
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Table 8 shows that 5.5% of all guns that could be traced to a specific 
FFL could not be connected to a 4473 form, and hence there was no 
information on the date or purchaser in the first sale.  This figure does not 
differ much between gang members and our non-gang comparison group 
(5.6% vs. 5.2%). 
 
Table 8 






Successful trace  
 
61.0% 67.2% 62.6% 
Traced to retail dealer but no 
4473 form available 
 
5.6% 5.2% 5.5% 
Other unsuccessful trace 
 













Sample: All guns confiscated from people under forty who were arrested (Group 4, 
Table 3) 
 IV. GUN TRAFFICKING TO GANG MEMBERS 
In addition to the prospect of “dirty dealers” supplying guns to gang 
members, another key concern for law enforcement has been the prospect of 
interstate trafficking as a source of crime guns.  The nature of gun 
regulation in the United States practically invites interstate gun trafficking.  
Federal law sets a minimum “floor” on how tightly guns must be regulated, 
with states and cities free to set stricter regulations as they wish (subject to 
some Second Amendment limits that the courts are still defining).  These 
differences in regulatory stringency create arbitrage opportunities to be 
exploited by underground entrepreneurs in purchasing guns in loose-
regulation states and reselling them in places like Illinois (or Chicago in 
particular) that have more restrictive gun laws. 
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the importance of trafficking in 
supplying guns to Chicago criminals comes from the natural experiment 
created by the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.82  That Act, 
 
 82 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993). 
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implemented in 1994, required for the first time that FFL dealers in all 
states conduct a background check of would-be purchasers before 
transferring a gun.83  States that already required a background check, 
including Illinois, were not directly affected by this provision.  But 
Chicago’s underground gun market was greatly affected.  Imports from the 
Deep South and other lax-control states had figured prominently in gun 
traces for handguns first sold before 1994.84  The distribution of source 
states changed abruptly in the year the new law was implemented; for 
example, in an analysis of guns recovered by the CPD in the years 
19961999, shown in Figure 4, the prevalence of guns first sold in the Deep 
South dropped from about 35% prior to 1994 down to just 15% within two 
years.85  This “iron pipeline” was largely shut down by the fact that the 
Brady Act made it more difficult for traffickers to buy new guns from 
dealers in the states with lax controls.86 
 
Figure 487 
Sources of Handguns Recovered in Chicago, 1996–99, by Year of First Sale 
 
 83 Ludwig & Cook, supra note 78, at 585.  
 84 Cook & Braga, supra note 75, at 304. 
 85 Id. at 306. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
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A. GEOGRAPHY OF SOURCES OF GANG GUNS 
Table 9 shows how the locations of the first sale of crime guns are 
distributed across different areas, by two factors: whether the violator 
caught with the gun is in a gang and whether the gun is new.88  We divide 
geographic locations into Cook County,89 the rest of Illinois, Indiana,90 and 
then the rest of the United States. 
Perhaps the strongest indicator for the role of gun trafficking in Table 
9 is the importance of Indiana as a source of crime guns, particularly for 
gang members.  The share of new (less than two years since first sale) gang 
guns that come from Indiana is 32%, versus just 13% for guns taken from 
our comparison group of non-gang gun violators.  The difference for older 
guns is smaller.  The fact that one-third of new gang guns confiscated in 
Chicago were first sold in Indiana suggests that trafficking is playing an 
important role in supplying new guns to the Chicago underworld and, in 
particular, that many of these guns are first acquired with the specific 
purpose of illegal export to Chicago.91 
  
 
 88 We define “new” as cases in which the time to crime is under two years. 
 89 Since Chicago essentially has no gun stores, this is equivalent to the Chicago suburbs. 
 90 Indiana is directly adjacent to Illinois and just a short drive from Chicago, particularly 
from the high-crime south side of the city. 
 91 An alternative explanation is that Indiana residents purchased these guns for their own 
use, moved their households to Chicago, and then had the gun stolen from them—at which 
point the gun entered the underground market for guns and was acquired by a gang member.  
See Kleck & Wang, supra note 75, at 1292–93.  While this sequence of events may account 
for a handful of cases, it is highly unlikely to be the predominant explanation.  Surveys of 
inmates about how they obtained their guns indicate that theft plays only a minor role.  See 
Table 2.  Furthermore, the flow of new Chicago residents from Indiana is simply not 
sufficient to account for the observed pattern.  According to 2007–2011 data from the 
American Community Survey, only about 2,000 people relocate from Indiana to Cook 
County (in which Chicago is located) in an average year, which amounts to 0.04% of the 
Cook County population—less than 1 in 1,000.  County-to-County Migration Flows: 2007–
2011 ACS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/migration/data/acs/
county_to_county_mig_2007_to_2011.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/7TKS-3VTW.  It seems very unlikely that this group accounts for one-third of all 
thefts and other transfers of new guns into the underground market in Chicago.  In any event, 
the importance of trafficking as a source of guns to Chicago is established by the natural 
experiment created by the Brady Act, as explained above. 
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Table 9 
Location of First Purchase, by Gang Status 
New Guns 











30.3% 22.5% 52.7% 35.0% 
Rest of Illinois 
 
9.8% 12.0% 15.6% 13.9% 
Indiana 
 
31.8% 23.9% 13.2% 17.2% 
Other states 
 
28.2% 41.7% 18.4% 33.9% 
Total 
percentage 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total # 714 5,374 537 1,968 
Sample: All successfully traced guns confiscated from people under the age of 
forty who were arrested (Group 5, Table 3). 
 
Figure 5 
Percent of Firearms (of Total Within Gang/Non-Gang) 
By Location of First Purchase, New Guns Only 
Firearms Recovered Jan. 1, 2009–Sept. 17, 2013 
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B. ARE PARTICULAR DEALERS RELATIVELY IMPORTANT IN 
SUPPLYING GANG GUNS? 
Are particular dealers especially “gang friendly” when it comes to the 
documented sales of new guns?  It would be useful for guiding regulatory 
enforcement to know if gangs intentionally seek out some dealers that bend 
the rules, perhaps by being particularly lax in how they monitor straw 
purchases, carry out background checks, or abide by any restrictions the 
surrounding state may have on multiple purchases.  Yet Table 10 shows that 
the three FFLs nationwide that account for the most guns confiscated from 
gang members in Chicago together account for a total of 27% of all new 
guns taken from that group.  This proportion is actually lower than the share 
accounted for by the top three FFLs among guns taken from our 
comparison group of non-gang violators (38%).  Given the geographic 
breakdown in Table 10, the only locale where gang guns are much more 
likely to come from the top three FFLs than the guns for the non-gang 
comparison group is the Cook County suburbs.  There, the top three FFLs 
account for 76% of gang guns and 65% of guns for the comparison group.92 
  
 
 92 These statistics are just for residents of Chicago, although they are essentially the 
same when we include all violators regardless of residence.   
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Table 10 
Concentration of New Gun Sales Among FFL Dealers for Possessors 
Residing in Chicago 
 Gang: 




















































Sample: All guns confiscated from people under the age of forty who were arrested 
(Group 5, Table 3). A “new” gun is one that was confiscated within two years of its 
first retail sale.  The sample is limited to possessors whose home addresses were in 
Chicago.  
 C. PREVALENCE OF GUNS WITH OBLITERATED SERIAL NUMBERS 
For a small share of the guns taken from Chicago arrestees, there has 
been an attempt to obliterate the serial number that is stamped into the 
metal frame.  Without a serial number, it is impossible for ATF to trace the 
gun back to the FFL where it was first sold.  Since successful traces are 
sometimes useful in criminal investigations, it is possible that a gun that is 
impossible to trace has greater value in the underground market that 
supplies criminals, and for that reason traffickers will sometimes attempt to 
remove the serial number.93  Consistent with the idea that trafficking may 
be more important for gang members than those not in gangs, the last row 
of Table 13 shows that a slightly larger share of guns taken from gang 
members have obliterated serial numbers (5.4% vs. 3.4%).  This difference 
 
 93 See Kleck & Wang, supra note 75, at 1267 (asserting that the strongest reliable 
indicator of gun trafficking is when a gun has an obliterated serial number). 
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is more pronounced for those with either no prior criminal record or one 
that includes a misdemeanor but not a felony.  Unsurprisingly, then, 
possession of a gun with an obliterated serial number is more prevalent 
among more serious criminals.  They or their gun suppliers may foresee 
illegal gun use, and prefer that the gun not be traceable.  For people with a 
prior felony record, the share of crime guns that have obliterated serial 

















Prior record includes misdemeanor 





















Sample: All guns confiscated from people under forty who were arrested (Group 4, 
Table 3). 
 CONCLUSION 
Political passions around gun control in America are intense.  Yet at 
least in principle, all sides in the gun control debate should welcome 
pragmatic law enforcement efforts to disrupt the illicit flow of guns to 
dangerous offenders.  Unfortunately, remarkably little is currently known 
about how criminals get their guns due to the limited data available to study 
this issue. 
To examine this question, one contribution of this Article is to 
assemble a unique dataset that comes from matching ATF data on crime 
guns (and the people and dealers involved in the first sale of those guns) 
with CPD data on the demographic characteristics, criminal history and 
gang affiliation of the violators caught with those guns.  One key strength 
of these data is our ability to examine and compare the sources of crime 
guns to gun violators who are gang members versus those who are not, and 
to see how other characteristics of the gun violator (or gun store) are 
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associated with the route through which a gun makes its way into the 
arrestee’s hands. 
Like other analyses of ATF crime-gun trace data, however, our data 
are limited by the fact that they include little direct information about what 
happens between the first sale by the FFL and the final transaction that put 
the gun into the hands of the violator.  Most traced guns are several years 
old and have changed hands a number of times by informal sale, loan, theft, 
or other means.  Ideally, we would like “end-to-end” trace data that would 
capture the sequence of transactions and in particular the transaction that 
brought the gun into the underworld ambit. 
It should also be evident that the sample of people caught with guns 
may not be representative of the entire population of people at risk for 
shooting or being shot.  Another important limitation comes from the 
challenges of matching two separate administrative data sources with 
missing data and data entry errors.  We have done our best to limit the 
errors arising from this process by supplementing exact matches with 
probabilistic matches.  Most likely, there remain some false negatives—
cases where the original buyer was the same as the arrestee, but was not 
identified as such. 
The approach used in this Article provides useful insights.  It also has 
obvious limitations and is only a start on the larger effort. Indeed, in part 
our analysis is intended to serve as a warning of the limitations of trace 
data.  Our research team, together with collaborators around the country, is 
currently working on a larger mixed-methods project that will seek to 
complement the data used in this Article with survey interviews of jail 
inmates, ethnographic research on gun traffickers, and social network 
analysis. 
With these limitations in mind, what can ATF crime-gun trace data tell 
us about how high-risk gang members get their guns?  The first clue is the 
most important by far: Crime guns carried by gang members tend to be 
quite old.  The median age from first retail sale is over ten years, and only 
10% are less than two years old.  The typical gang member is not carrying a 
family heirloom, but rather a gun that has been circulating for years that he 
probably acquired in the previous few months.  Second, and closely related, 
very few gang members buy their guns new from a dealer.  Only 2% were 
purchased directly from an FFL in a documented sale.  Of course, that 
leaves the possibility of undocumented sales, but they also are a minor part 
of the picture: at most 5% of guns found in the hands of gang members 
were sold out the back door by “dirty dealers.”94 
 
 94 The actual share is probably less because some of the 5% figure reported in Table 8 is 
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The “gray area” in terms of the degree to which dealers are complicit 
in getting guns into the hands of high-risk gang members has to do with 
straw purchasing.  We find that 15% of new guns confiscated from male 
gang members were first purchased by a female—one potential indication 
of straw purchasing.  From the administrative data available to us, we have 
no way of knowing how often a dealer could have reasonably known that a 
woman buying a gun was actually buying the weapon for someone legally 
prohibited from owning one, rather than buying it for herself.  Another gray 
area is the possibility that dealers are selling used guns to gang members 
(either documented or not). We have no way to assess the importance of 
that channel. 
We do know that the large majority of guns that wind up in the hands 
of gang members involved at least one intermediary—a third person that 
helped get the gun from the FFL dealer into the hands of the gang 
member.95  Besides straw purchases, we know that trafficking is of 
considerable importance in supplying guns to criminals.  That fact is clearly 
demonstrated by the large and abrupt drop in the importance of the Deep 
South as a source of guns used in crime following the 1994 implementation 
of the Brady Act.  Our new results suggest that trafficking is more common 
for guns that wind up confiscated from gang members than non-gang 
members, as indicated by the share of gang guns that come from out of 
state, and the higher, albeit still modest, share of gang guns that have 
obliterated serial numbers. 
What do these results imply for law enforcement?  The strategies 
available to law enforcement officials to reduce gun access to high-risk 
people fall into essentially two categories: those focused on what happens at 
the licensed gun dealer, and those focused on what happens after the gun 
leaves the dealer’s premises—in what we previously called the “secondary 
gun market.”96  The question of primary policy interest is: which strategy 
generates the greatest reduction in gun violence per additional dollar spent?  
Unfortunately, this question cannot be answered from the evidence 
presented in this Article.  We would need much better evidence than is 
currently available about the relative public safety benefits from each extra 
dollar allocated to monitoring or investigating dealers versus investigating 
people suspected of illegal behavior in the secondary gun market. 
 
through actual theft at gun stores, as well as some legal sales where the paperwork was just 
lost. 
 95 Theft, which we cannot measure in our data, could be considered a case where the 
intermediary involuntarily helps put the gun into the hands of a gang member.  
 96 Cook et al., supra note 45, at 68. 
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Obvious dealer misbehavior seems to be less common as a source of 
crime guns to gang members than do secondary market sales that involve at 
least one intermediary serving as a straw purchaser or interstate trafficker or 
in some other role.  This finding by itself is not dispositive of what the most 
cost-effective enforcement strategy is.  Yet it is worth pointing out that 
investigatory efforts focused on the secondary market (both first purchasers 
and final possessors) can do “double duty” and help deter not just 
secondary market sales but also some important forms of dealer 
misbehavior, such as looking the other way during sales that are obvious 
straw purchases. 
We hypothesized that the gang members who are responsible for the 
majority of shootings in Chicago may have easier access to guns than do 
other people.  This hypothesis would help reconcile our findings in 
Underground Gun Markets that the underground gun market as a whole has 
high transactions costs,97 yet over 80% of Chicago’s homicides involve 
guns.98  While we do not have direct measures of accessibility to gang 
members and our comparison group of non-gang members, we do see some 
differences in how the two groups get guns: gang members seem to be more 
reliant on trafficking and straw purchases.  But the fact that the guns taken 
from gang members are on average quite old, despite the widely-reported 
preference of criminals for newer guns, suggests that even for members of 
violent Chicago street gangs, the underground market for guns does not 
“work” as well as the licit market.  Regulation and enforcement in that 
sense are making a difference.  
 
 97 These high transaction costs include high price markups, long waits, the existence of 
brokers who charge transactions fees, and a nontrivial chance of failure for each attempt to 
get a gun. 
 98 Cook et al., supra note 20, at F594–96. 




Highest Charge at Arrest of Possessor 
  Gang Gun Non-Gang Gun Total 
Homicide - 1st or 2nd Degree 10 1 11 
 
0.15% 0.04% 0.12% 
Criminal Sexual Assault 119 2 121 
 
1.81% 0.09% 1.36% 
Robbery 83 30 113 
 
1.26% 1.30% 1.27% 
Aggravated Assault 83 70 153 
 
1.26% 3.02% 1.72% 
Aggravated Battery 33 10 43 
 
0.50% 0.43% 0.48% 
Burglary 14 4 18 
 
0.21% 0.17% 0.20% 
Larceny - Theft 7 3 10 
 
0.11% 0.13% 0.11% 
Motor Vehicle Theft 13 2 15 
 
0.20% 0.09% 0.17% 
Simple Assault 5 7 12 
 
0.08% 0.30% 0.13% 
Simple Battery 40 59 99 
 
0.61% 2.55% 1.11% 
Forgery and Counterfeiting 0 1 1 
 
0.00% 0.04% 0.01% 
Fraud 0 3 3 
 
0.00% 0.13% 0.03% 
Vandalism 2 3 5 
 
0.03% 0.13% 0.06% 
Weapons 4,692 1,445 6137 
 
71.25% 62.42% 68.96% 
Prostitution 0 3 3 
 
0.00% 0.13% 0.03% 
Drug Abuse Violations 466 161 627 
 
7.08% 6.95% 7.04% 
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  Gang Gun Non-Gang Gun Total 
Gambling 1 0 1 
 
0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 
Offenses Against Family and 
Children / Involving Children 0 2 2 
 
0.00% 0.09% 0.02% 
Driving Under the Influence 0 2 2 
 
0.00% 0.09% 0.02% 
Liquor Laws 0 5 5 
 
0.00% 0.22% 0.06% 
Disorderly Conduct 10 22 32 
 
0.15% 0.95% 0.36% 
Miscellaneous Non-Index Offenses 64 0 64 
 
0.97% 0.00% 0.72% 
Miscellaneous Municipal Code 
Violations 0 3 3 
 
0.00% 0.13% 0.03% 
Traffic Violations 2 0 2 
 
0.03% 0.00% 0.02% 
Missing Information 1,024 477 1501 
 
15.55% 20.60% 16.87% 
Total 6,585 2,315 8,900 
 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Note: FBI UCR codes used for crime designations. 
Not Displayed: Involuntary Manslaughter, Arson, Embezzlement, Criminal Sexual 
Abuse, Stolen Property, and Warrant Arrests (all cells were empty for each 
category). 
Note: Includes individuals who were arrested in possession of weapons, regardless 
of whether the weapon was ultimately traced successfully. 
Sample: All people under 40 who were arrested in connection with a confiscated 
gun submitted for tracing (Group 4, Table 3). 
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Table A2 
Demographic Characteristics Across Groups 2, 3, and 4 
  Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Male 69.90% 71.94% 73.11% 
Missing Gender 25.86% 24.91% 24.30% 
    Black 60.18% 61.17% 62.34% 
Hispanic 10.60% 11.44% 11.26% 
White 2.86% 2.00% 1.72% 
Other Race 0.52% 0.51% 0.43% 
Unknown Race 22.85% 21.92% 21.18% 
Missing Race 6.46% 6.20% 5.98% 
Age (Mean) 29.07 24.28 23.96 
Age (Min) 11 11 11 
Age (Max) 97 39 39 
Age (Median) 25 23 23 
 
Note: Percentages reflect percent of individuals within group. 
Note: Races may sum to over 100% due to double-coding. 
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Table A3 
Table 5 Split  Along Age Lines (<30, 30–39, 40+) 
Possessor Under 30 
 
Gang members Non-gang Total 
Current Arrest Includes Felony Charge 74.55% 61.72% 71.59% 
Prior Felony Arrest 65.15% 29.70% 56.97% 
No Prior Record 16.50% 20.77% 17.49% 
Under 21 at Arrest 41.62% 25.70% 37.94% 
Total Number 5,745 1,724 7,469 
Possessor Age 30–39 
 
Gang members Non-gang Total 
Current Arrest Includes Felony Charge 73.87% 51.71% 65.32% 
Prior Felony Arrest 59.95% 22.52% 45.52% 
No Prior Record 20.25% 25.95% 22.45% 
Under 21 at Arrest 0.11% 0.18% 0.14% 
Total Number 884 555 1,439 
Possessor 40 and Over 
 
Gang members Non-gang Total 
Current Arrest Includes Felony Charge 72.20% 45.13% 55.83% 
Prior Felony Arrest 53.04% 20.35% 30.86% 
No Prior Record 24.53% 26.00% 25.53% 
Under 21 at Arrest 0.70% 0.22% 0.38% 
Total Number 428 904 1,332 
 
Sample: Based on Group 4 but with different ages. 
Note: A small minority of individuals (7 in total) appear to be erroneously coded as 
having different ages between data sets.   
2015] SOURCES OF CRIME GUNS IN CHICAGO 759 
 
Table A4 
Table 5 Split by Year of Gun Recovery (for Group 4) 
Gun Recovered in 2009, Possessor Under 40 
 
Gang members Non-gang Total 
Current Arrest Includes Felony Charge 73.82% 57.86% 70.20% 
Prior Felony Arrest 66.60% 28.57% 57.98% 
No Prior Record 16.91% 24.46% 18.62% 
Under 21 at Arrest 36.75% 16.43% 32.15% 
Total Number 1,910 560 2,470 
Gun Recovered in 2010, Possessor Under 40 
 
Gang members Non-gang Total 
Current Arrest Includes Felony Charge 75.66% 55.17% 70.85% 
Prior Felony Arrest 67.02% 27.01% 57.62% 
No Prior Record 16.11% 23.56% 17.86% 
Under 21 at Arrest 36.74% 15.90% 31.85% 
Total Number 1,701 522 2,223 
Gun Recovered in 2011, Possessor under 40 
 
Gang members Non-gang Total 
Current Arrest Includes Felony Charge 75.23% 61.57% 71.65% 
Prior Felony Arrest 63.87% 26.96% 54.19% 
No Prior Record 18.96% 21.57% 19.64% 
Under 21 at Arrest 37.49% 20.35% 33.00% 
Total Number 1,619 575 2,194 
Gun Recovered in 2012, Possessor Under 40 
 
Gang members Non-gang Total 
Current Arrest Includes Felony Charge 76.78% 61.62% 72.74% 
Prior Felony Arrest 62.75% 24.04% 52.42% 
No Prior Record 15.72% 20.40% 16.97% 
Under 21 at Arrest 36.59% 21.82% 32.65% 
Total Number 1,361 495 1,856 
Gun Recovered in 2013, Possessor Under 40 
 
Gang members Non-gang Total 
Current Arrest Includes Felony Charge 74.56% 61.57% 71.27% 
Prior Felony Arrest 61.09% 25.76% 52.15% 
No Prior Record 15.38% 20.09% 16.57% 
Under 21 at Arrest 34.47% 20.09% 30.83% 
Total Number 676 229 905 
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